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Abstract: The Amsterdam Treaty has established the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ). Since then, it is an example of a policy-making area creating 
its way quickly and comprehensively. However, in this paper the main dilemma 
is to what extent the Schengen development has modified the framework of AFSJ 
and how it adapts in this policy while being an example of enhanced coopera-
tion and differentiated integration model. Developments in this area are part of 
a realisation that European states need to act together to better face new chal-
lenges to peace and internal security, while ensuring respect for democracy and 
human rights. It is important to add, that cooperation in the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice has been driven by forces different from that seen in other 
policy areas.
Key words: Schengen; European integration; internal security; area of freedom; secu-
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Introduction
The European Union is making strong inroads into areas of security traditionally 
reserved to states (Cierco & Tavares de Silva, 2016, pp. 2 – 3), especially into internal 
security. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has seen significant policy 
developments since the late 1990s (Kaunert & Leonard, 2010, p. 143). Some schol-
ars underlines the fact that there has been no other example of a policy-making area 
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creating its way so quickly and comprehensively to the centre of the treaties and to 
the top of the EU’s policy making agenda (Monar, 2000).
However, such dynamism seems justifiable and might be explained by the theory. 
In this case, the „spillover-enlargement effect”1 refers to the real and perceived criminal 
justice challenges presented by the Common Market and the Schengen area that have 
been magnified by the expectation of the widening membership of the EU. Here, 
„spillover” refers to how cooperation in one area of EU public policy can contribute 
to more integration in another. In this regard, EU cooperation on free movement has 
helped shape the perceived need for more cooperation to manage borders and fight 
transnational organised crime. This has been intensified by the constant prospect in 
the last decades of expanding the Common Market and widening the passport-free 
Schengen area (Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 274). 
Therefore, the subject of the analysis is the Schengen cooperation and its develop-
ment. In order to define the research problem we must consider the Schengen system 
modifications to the framework of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Accordingly, 
the research question is: to what extent the Schengen cooperation is an example of 
AFSJ’s enhanced cooperation? The main hypothesis is formulated as follow: the more 
advanced is Schengen cooperation within the AFSJ, the more differentiated integration 
model it represents.
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Subsequently, it was the Amsterdam Treaty that established the Area of Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice, which replaced the policy area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
While the Maastricht Treaty had only described common areas of interest in which 
cooperation could happen in order to attain other EU objectives, the Amsterdam 
Treaty made the concept of „Freedom, Security and Justice” an objective in itself for the 
EU. In addition, the notable achievement of the Amsterdam Treaty was the inclusion 
of Schengen into the framework of the EU (Kaunert & Leonard, 2010, p. 145).
Moving forward, over the past decade, increased emphasis has focused on a dimen-
sion of European cooperation also designed to contribute to the goals lauded by the 
Nobel Committee in 2012 – cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs 
with the aim of preserving the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Developments 
in this sphere are part of a realisation that states within Europe need to act together 
to better face new challenges to peace and internal security, while ensuring respect 
for democracy and human rights when confronting these challenges collectively 
1  For more: (Rosenbaum, 2010, pp. 287 – 292); (Zito & Schout, 2009, pp. 1103 – 1123). 
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(Holzhacker & Luif, 2014, p. 1). EU Member States have thus decided to enhance 
their cooperation in a process driven by national bureaucracies. There state-centred 
accounts emphasise the resilience of nation-states, which is the EU as a device for 
attaining policy objectives that are unlikely to be achieved at the domestic level alone 
(Kaunert & Leonard, 2010, p. 144).
To continue to preserve the continent’s security and stability pressure will increase 
on cooperation in policing, border security, immigration and judicial matters. The 
challenge is to create policies, institutions and implementation mechanisms in the 
policy area, both at intergovernmental and supranational level, which are not only 
effective and efficient but also uphold the continent’s democratic principles and respect 
for human rights (Holzhacker & Luif, 2014, p. 3). The practical approach to such 
assumptions is Schengen cooperation which might be comprehended as an enhanced 
cooperation within the EU.
Enhanced cooperation2 is a procedure where a minimum of 9 EU countries are 
allowed to establish advanced integration in an area within EU structures but without 
the other EU countries being involved (at least at the first stage). This allows them to 
move at different speeds and towards different goals than those outside the enhanced 
cooperation areas. The procedure is designed to overcome paralysis, where a proposal 
is blocked by an individual country or a small group of countries who do not wish 
to be part of the initiative.3 
Enhanced cooperation rules after the Treaty of Lisbon states that acts adopted 
under the framework of such cooperation scheme are binding only for the participants. 
Most importantly, the TFEU sets out uniform rules for the establishment of enhanced 
cooperation in all sectors that do not fall within the EU’s exclusive competence. This 
is because all member states previously agreed on a complete transfer of sovereignty 
in those matters. Therefore, allowing a group of member states to move further ahead 
than the EU, could be detrimental for the unity of the system (Cantore, 2011, p. 7). 
Furthermore, enhanced cooperation was designed as a tool for future integration at the 
general EU level, thus its regulatory scheme provides guarantees for members which are 
not involved and gives the EU political institutions (mainly the Commission and the 
Parliament) a crucial role in the approval of those schemes (Cantore, 2011, p. 4). 
2  It is worth to add that it is decided by qualified majority or by unanimity only in foreign 
and security policy. The Lisbon Treaty, Article 20 TEU and Arts. 326 – 334 TFEU.
3  EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law. (n.d.). Glossary of summaries. Enhanced 
cooperation. Retrieved September 13, 2016, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/
enhanced_cooperation.html.
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However it is worth to note, that cooperation in the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs has been driven by forces different from that seen in other policy areas. It is 
a sphere where the Council has taken the lead and the position of states and their 
leaders is paramount. Issues of state security and criminal law strike at the very heart of 
the state. This is not a policy area like the creation of a single market, where, according 
to Andrew Moravcsik’s realist-oriented argument (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 4), economic 
interest of states in the EU may predominate. Nor is it like industry regulation, such 
as the example of REACH Regulation on chemicals, where lobbying at EU and 
member state level by industry and NGOs representing a variety of interests plays 
a significant role4. It is an area where cooperation is driven more by a response to 
events and where states and their leaders see cooperation as fruitful. Of course some 
of the initial impetus for moving cooperation within AFSJ forward came from the 
completion of the single market and the lifting of border controls under the Schengen 
Treaty. It facilitated not only the trade in legal goods and the movement of tourists 
and workers across borders, but also the movement of those involved in cross-border 
criminal activity and the trade in illegal goods. Increased migration to Europe has 
also been an impetus for policy-making in this field. What is more, development in 
this area have also been driven by terrorist threats to peace and stability facing the 
European continent (Holzhacker & Luif, 2014, p. 8).
Referring to the research problem, Monar sets forth three challenges for European 
action in this area (Monar, 2010, pp. 24 – 26). It is noticed, that the Justice and Home 
Affairs domain involves core functions of the state providing citizens with internal 
security, controlling success to the national territory, and administering justice which 
belong to the basic justification and legitimacy of the state, and is thus an area where 
“national sovereignty” is highly valued. In response, the institutional framework for 
policy-making in this field has focused on facilitating cooperation and coordination 
between member states, and nor on the communitarian approaches used and available 
in other policy areas. Thus, the establishment of the three major agencies5 in this policy 
area, Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, focus on cooperation and coordination func-
tions without executive operational powers. It is also worth to add, that the outputs 
of the policy-making institutions (Council and Commission) have relied on “soft 
governance” instruments, because proposing directives has been on mutual evaluation, 
scoreboards and common threat assessments (Holzhacker & Luif, 2014, p. 8).
4  For more: (Haverland, 2009, pp. 1 – 14); (Selin, 2007, pp. 63 – 93).
5  For more: (Kaunert, Leonard, & Occhipinti, 2013, pp. 273 – 284).
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Schengen cooperation
Besides this collaboration on Justice and Home Affairs the Schengen cooperation, 
dealing with the removal of personal controls at the internal borders, was initiated 
in 1985 by five EC countries. This fragmented situation was somewhat simplified 
by the Maastricht Treaty which introduced a „Third Pillar”, dealing with all matters 
of Justice and Home Affairs. With the Amsterdam Treaty some parts of Justice and 
Home Affairs were moved into the supranational „First Pillar”: visas, asylum, immi-
gration and other policies related to free movement of persons. Provisions on police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters were left in the intergovernmental Third 
Pillar. A Protocol integrating the Schengen6 acquis into the framework of the EU was 
annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty (Holzhacker & Luif, 2014, p. 4).
With the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – 
TFUE), all matters concerning the AFSJ are grouped together in Title V of Part 
Three.7 Most decisions in this area are now made according to the ordinary legislative 
procedure, with the Commission proposing legislation, the Council (by qualified 
majority) as well as the European Parliament (by simple majority) deciding on the 
legislation and the Court of Justice of the EU ruling on the legality of the acts 
(Holzhacker & Luif, 2014, p. 4).
Nevertheles, Schengen governance after the Lisbon Treaty required a revision8. It 
was notably necessary to take into account the new role of the European Parliament 
as co-legislator as well for the measures which had formerly been under the “third 
pillar” regime and the new role of the Commission. It was also necessary to limit 
the risk of national measures which could jeopardise the abolition of the internal 
borders checks by preparing at the same time an emergency procedure at EU level in 
case of problems at the external borders putting the overall functioning of Schengen 
cooperation at risk (De Capitani, 2014, p. 115).
The “Schengen area” now covers more than 4,300,000 km², stretching from the 
Arctic to the shores of the Mediterranean. In a world where, according to international 
law, an individual has the right to leave and to be readmitted into the territory of his 
or her country but another country is not obliged to give anyone access to its territory, 
6  For more: (Zaiotti, 2011, pp. 19 – 46).
7  EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law. (2012, October 12). Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union: Consolidated version. Title V. Official Journal of the EU. C 326. Retrie-
ved September 19, 2016, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=celex%3A-
12012E%2FTXT.
8  For more: (Zaiotti, R., 2013, pp.161 – 176).
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the existence of freedom of movement without internal border checks in the Schengen 
area is a quantum leap (De Capitani, 2014, p. 102). Implementation of four great 
freedoms of movement (Florica et al., 2010, pp. 367 – 378) , including in particular the 
free movement of people and abolition of border controls at the internal borders of the 
Schengen area, as well as a simplified way of crossing the external borders of the EU 
are certainly one of the most important part of EU integration process. The abolition 
of border controls at the internal borders of the EU, i.e. the free movement of workers, 
goods and services are considered as crucial for the success of the single market or 
economic union of the countries members of the EU (Mahmutovic, 2015, p. 4).
The rise of freedom of movement rights in Europe now codified with the legal 
category of European Union citizenship represents a startling reversal of the historical 
tradition of state sovereignty. States have historically been defined in terms of insiders 
(citizens) and outsiders (foreigners). The new supranational rights supersede this 
traditional distinction by reducing or even removing the ability of European states 
to discriminate between their own citizens and those of other EU member states. 
Borders within the European Union still matter, but the remaining barriers to freedom 
of movement within ‘fortress Europe’ are practical rather than legal, and even they 
are rapidly disappearing (Maas, 2012, p. 233). Furthermore, necessity for common 
approach to the management of external borders arise among other things, from the 
fact that the abolition of internal border controls have increased security deficit within 
the Schengen area and therefore tried to find a solution that will compensate for this 
problem (Mahmutovic, 2015, p. 6).
However, two aspects of the freedom of movement of people showed largely 
difficulties in implementation. The first relates to the immigration aspect, i.e. the free 
movement of nationals of third countries and it involves the harmonization of national 
legislations in the field of immigration and asylum. The second is a classic police aspect 
(Occhipinti, 2015, pp. 234 – 258) relating to the harmonization of national criminal 
law provisions. Given that both aspects are associated with sensitive national interests, 
the implementation of freedom of movement would require one more precondition – 
to reduce the impact of nation-state concept, or inter-governmental approach in the 
governance of European integration (Thwaites, 2003, pp. 253 – 262). 
What is more, integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU framework was 
successful even if it required two trade-offs, which are related to the main hypothesis. 
The first one was the need to split the Schengen acquis by applying the Community 
method to policies linked with borders, immigration, asylum and judicial cooperation 
in civil matters and by preserving the “intergovernmental” method for policies in 
the field on public security and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (formerly 
the “third pillar”). With these two dimensions being present at the same time in 
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real-life politics for several years, it was necessary to deal with the same political 
objective with parallel complementary measures adopted by different majorities in 
different institutional frameworks (the “first and third pillar”). Thankfully, this sort 
of resolutions drew to an end with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
merger of the so called third pillar with the ordinary regime. However, the measures 
adopted before the entry into force the Treaty in the context of the so-called “third 
pillar”, including those that were part of the Schengen acquis until December 2014 
remained excluded from the “ordinary” legal regime, in particular from the control of 
the Commission and the Court9 unless changes occurred in the modified legislative 
framework of Lisbon. This raised the question of whether those measures, which were 
designed in a different historical moment, were truly compatible with the post-Lisbon 
institutional context (de Capitani, 2014, p. 110).
The second trade-off related to the research question was to define the Schengen 
system as “enhanced cooperation” between some EU Member States. It was an elegant 
solution designed, as the United Kingdom and Ireland would not be obliged to opt 
out from it. However, this definition, even if formally correct, has become somehow 
extravagant because, since the Treaty of Amsterdam, all new EU Member States have 
to accept all the Schengen acquis. But if an “enhanced cooperation” will exclude just 
a few of EU Member States, what would at the end be the exact scope of an “ordinary” 
cooperation? (de Capitani, 2014, p. 110).
Moving to the judicial sphere, even the Court of Justice of the EU jurisprudence 
shows increasing sympathy with this strange “enhanced cooperation”, the Court has 
rejected United Kingdom request to take advantage of new measures built on the 
Schengen acquis (such as the Visa Information System or Frontex) without accepting 
its basic rules (de Capitani, 2014, p. 110). The Court of Justice of the EU stated that 
the coherence of the Schengen acquis and of future developments thereof means that 
the States which take part in that acquis are not obliged, when they develop it and 
deepen the closer cooperation which they have been authorised to establish by article 
1 of the Schengen Protocol, to provide for special adaptation measures for the other 
Member States which have not taken part in the adoption of the measures relating 
to earlier stages of the acquis evolution10.
This two trade-offs moved this consideration smoothly to the papers’ hypothesis 
related issue which is reflection on asymmetry as an instrument of differentiated 
9  For more: (Stone Sweet, 2010).
10  EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law. (2010, October 26). Case C-482/08: United 
Kingdom vs Council. ECR 2010 I-10413. Retrieved September 15, 2016, from http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62008CJ0482. 
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integration (Fossum, 2015, p. 800) in the current phase of the EU integration process 
also in the AFSJ sphere. Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (2013) have also 
defined the EU as a system of differentiated integration and have argued that dif-
ferentiation is an essential and, most likely, enduring characteristic of the EU (pp. 
1 – 13). Moreover, differentiation has been a concomitant of deepening and widening, 
gaining in importance as the EU’s tasks, competencies and membership have grown” 
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, pp. 764 – 782). Against this background, asymmetry can 
be conceptualised as an instrument of differentiated integration useful to guarantee 
unity without jeopardising the constitutional diversity that inspires the European 
project (in light of what now Art. 4.2 TEU provides for concerning the duty to “respect 
the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government”). Indeed, differentiated integration has frequently 
been seen as “a challenge to the authority of the Union, to its telos, to the unity of its 
policies, laws and institutions, and to any prospect of it developing into a political 
community based on shared rights and obligations of membership” (Martinico, 2015, 
pp. 2 – 3). In such an understanding some of Schengen regime achievements that were 
already discussed in this paper are examples of the EU differentiated integration within 
the AFSJ sphere. They prove that Schengen regime is a complex model of integration, 
where the more advanced this polity is, the more differentiated integration within 
the AFSJ it represents.
Smart borders
Within years, the Schengen practice reveals that the more advanced is open-border 
policy within the EU, the more intense should be protection of its external borders. 
So in more practical aspect of current EU border management strategy, it follows 
that the Schengen implied the establishment of two different approaches. The first 
is immigration that is being consumed in strengthening the integrity of the external 
borders through adherence to uniform principles of border management, while the 
second one represents a classic police aspect relating to activities across internal borders 
(Colombeau, 2015, pp. 1 – 14) aiming at preventing criminals and criminal groups to 
take advantage of the abolition of internal border controls by committing unlawful 
acts (Hobbing, 2006).
In such differentiation, border management is currently going through significant 
transformation. Proposals for a smart borders system first formally came to light in 
a 2008 Commission paper, but received renewed momentum with the increased 
number of people travelling to Europe in the aftermath of revolutions and civil wars in 
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Mediterranean mainly since 2011 (Jones, p. 2). To address the need for the Schengen 
Area to move towards more modern and efficient border management by using newest 
technology, the European Commission proposed the ‘Smart Borders package’11 on 
February 2013. This package contained legal proposals for establishing two systems 
that should help to speed up, facilitate and reinforce border-check procedures for 
third-country nationals (TCNs) travelling into the Schengen Area12.
At first, the Entry/Exit System (EES), which is a central system to record the time 
and place of entry and exit of all third-country nationals travelling to/from the Schen-
gen Area. It might extend biometric ID checks, currently reserved for those requiring 
visas, to all non-EU nationals seeking to enter the EU, with the intention of helping 
the authorities identify those who have stayed longer than permitted - “overstayers” 
(Jones, p. 1). The information collected for the EES will include alphanumeric data 
(names, type and number of travel document(s), date and time of entry and exit, and, 
after a three year “transitional period to allow for Member States’ adapting processes 
at the border crossing points” also fingerprints (Jones, p. 2).
Because the collection of this data would lead to longer waiting times at border 
crossing points, a counterpart system – the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) 13, 
has also been proposed. It is supposed to be a uniform programme to allow pre-vetted 
and frequent travellers from third countries to enter (and exit) the Schengen Area 
with minimal border checks14. Those not deemed a security risk would be allowed 
to enter the EU through Automated Border Control gates (ABC), already a growing 
feature of many European airports. The Commission argues that as a result, “border 
checks of Registered Travellers would be much faster than nowadays,” although these 
claims have been disputed. The proposals are considered by the Commission “as part 
of the continuous development of the Integrated Border Management Strategy of the 
European Union”, and there will apparently be numerous “synergies” between the 
11  For more: European Commission - Migration and Home Affairs. (2016, April 26). Smart 
Borders. Retrieved October 10, 2016, from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/
policies/borders-and-visas/smart-borders/index_en.htm.
12  EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law. (2016, March 9). Regulation (EC) No 2016/399 
on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Border 
Code). Official Journal of the EU. L 77. Retrieved September 17, 2016, from http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32016R0399.
13  COM (2013) 96 final. 
14  European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area 
of freedom, security and justice. (2015). Smart Borders Pilot Project Report on the technical 
conclusions of the Pilot, p. 5. Retrieved September 10, 2016, from http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/
Publications/Reports/Smart%20Borders%20-%20Technical%20Report.pdf.
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new systems and existing ones. For instance, The EES will share the same Biometric 
Matching System as the Visa Information System (VIS) (Jones, p. 2).
This approach aimed at improving the level of management and control of pas-
sengers flow in a way of technological refreshment and strengthening of the existing 
system of border checks which should provide greater security and faster throughput 
of passengers15. The proposals for implementation of Smart Borders Package and its 
operational use are supported also with Stockholm Program16. The legal basis for 
the introduction of these systems represent articles 74, 77 of the TFEU on the basis 
of which the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative 
procedure will enact implementing legislation – Regulation17. 
However, introduction of Smart Borders requires certain amendments of existing 
Schengen Borders Code. Such modifications are already known, and it is emphasized 
that these issues should be considered separately18. Besides, some changes have legal 
and technical character like those in Article 2, which stand about the introduction 
of additional definitions of EES and RTP. Changes to Article 5(2) relating to the 
general obligation of data entry of third country nationals in the EES and exceptions 
from that could be also placed in previous category. Mandatory authentication of 
electronic media with data (chip) which is located in the traveller documents should 
be introduced in Article 7(2).
The pilot programme of this system examined the main architectural options for 
the EES and RTP, and their potential impacts on related systems such as the VIS, 
Biometric Matching System (BMS), national entry and exit systems and existing 
15  COM (2008) 69 final.
16  See: EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law. (2010, May 4). The Stockholm Programme 
– an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens. Official Journal of the European 
Union. C115/1. Retrieved September 17, 2016, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=OJ%3AC%3A2010%3A115%3ATOC.
17  The applicable regulations in this are: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement 
of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code); Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council (EC) No 1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land 
borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention; Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC) No 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information 
System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short stay visas (VIS Regula-
tion); Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC) No 810/2009 establishing 
a Community Code on Visas; Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) 
No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT 
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice. COM (2013) 97 final; (Mahmutovic, 2015).
18  COM(2011) 118 final.
Evolution of Schengen 131
border management systems. The study assessed the pros and cons of two main possible 
architecture options – developing the EES and RTP as two separate systems (option A) 
or as a single system (option B). It appears that option A would reduce the complex-
ity of the systems’ development and implementation. However, it would generate 
a significant risk of functionality and data overlap. This could lead to a much bigger 
development effort and a duplication of hardware and software, negatively impacting 
investment and maintenance costs. On a contrary, option B is in line with the process 
and minimal dataset approach for both the EES and RTP. While infrastructure and 
development costs would be lower, there would be a risk of added complexity in the 
systems’ development and implementation, which should be managed carefully19.
The pilot also confirms that it is feasible to enrol fingerprints at all types of borders 
in various set-ups. However, in practice, enrolling four fingerprints is faster than 
enrolling eight or ten, although a higher number of fingerprints will deliver better 
accuracy for subsequent use. The quality of the fingerprints enrolled is generally fit 
for purpose. Enrolling fingerprints in controlled conditions is seen as the biometric 
identifier that is the least intrusive to travellers, according to both travellers’ and 
border guards’ feedback. 
Furthermore, desk research proves that time can be saved if some processes are 
better streamlined (e.g. by searching the VIS using the passport number). The deploy-
ment of accelerators such as ABC gates and supportive kiosks could further decrease 
border-crossing times. It was observed that the technology set-up and integration, 
as well travellers’ interaction with it, influences the results much more than the type 
of border.20
However critiques of the civil liberties implications and proposed costs (currently 
approx. €1.1 billion) have come from academics, data protection experts, civil society 
groups and European political parties (notably the Greens or the European Free 
Alliance). Given the lack of a European policy on ‘overstayers’, the ability of an EES 
to effectively address the issue has been questioned, as has the system’s compatibility 
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in light of the Court of Justice’s ruling on 
the Data Retention Directive. The EES has come in for particular criticism, with the 
19  European Commission – Directorate General for Home Affairs. (2014, October). Tech-
nical Study on Smart Borders – Final Report, pp. 10 – 11. Retrieved September 13, 2016, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-borders/docs/
smart_borders_executive_summary_en.pdf.
20  European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area 
of freedom, security and justice. (2015). Smart Borders Pilot Project Report on the technical 
conclusions of the Pilot, pp. 5 – 14. Retrieved September 10, 2016, from http://www.eulisa.europa.
eu/Publications/Reports/Smart%20Borders%20-%20Technical%20Report.pdf.
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European Data Protection Supervisor arguing that it “should not be created before 
a thorough evaluation of existing systems can effectively be performed,” and calling 
the proposed system might be “costly, unproven and even intrusive” (Jones, p. 3).
Furthermore, same observers claim that such extensive knowledge of and potential 
control over individuals that “smart borders” appear to promise is no doubt tempting 
to governments and the state agencies responsible for border control. Critique of 
the smart borders proposals has been, and still is extensive. For some human rights 
activists ‘freedom’ in the EU’s ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ is little more than 
a buzzword when it comes to border control and policing (Jones, p. 9).
At the end it is also worth to add, that the so-called Schengen compensatory 
measures such as the Schengen Information System (Dragan, 2015, pp. 33 – 53) or the 
European Dactylographic System (Eurodac) have been the centre of much attention. 
However, the research on these security measures has focused almost solely on their 
effect on liberty, human rights, and the like (Parkin, 2011). Not much attention has 
been given to the actual effectiveness of the security remedies taken in the European 
Union (EU) to compensate for the abolition of border controls, despite effectiveness 
being an obvious source of legitimacy in the realm of security (Pedersen, 2015, 
pp. 541 – 559).
Conclusion
Nearly a decade after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Schengen cooperation 
has been one of the most active policy domain in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice. The EU has tried to manage contemporaneously and consistently freedom 
of movement (human mobility) with security from external threats (combining human 
security with the avoidance of abusive interventions on individual freedoms). This 
has been possible also because even after transitions of the Lisbon Treaty, Schengen 
cooperation has preserved its specificities (de Capitani, 2014, pp. 117 – 118). Besides, 
Schengen cooperation has had to comply with the Community acquis by becoming 
more transparent and accountable. Also by preserving its specificity, Schengen coopera-
tion will continue to overlap with traditionally sovereignty-related policies by requir-
ing more efforts from Member States and, evidently, strong and sincere cooperation. 
The intervention of the European Union enhances Member States’ responsibilities as 
borders are no longer only “national” but have become an essential element in ensur-
ing freedom of movement as an European common value. In the light of this, the 
new Schengen evaluation mechanism does not refer only to Member States’ territory 
but to a supranational area which requires an European approach. As opposed to the 
traditional internal market policies, Schengen and freedom, security and justice will 
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enhance Member States’ obligation (de Capitani, 2014, p. 118) and will inevitably 
place national administrations and internal orders under strain. 
It is also necessary to mention, that current political situation nearby the EU’s 
borders clearly influences the European Union Member States approach on internal 
security matters (like issues of asylum and irregular immigration), and in particular, 
raises a number of pertinent questions regarding the nature of such cooperation. What 
is especially puzzling, however, is the emergence and stability of agreements, such 
as the Schengen and Dublin Conventions21, in light of what appears to be a highly 
inequitable distribution of costs and benefits among the participating states in this 
policy area (Thielemann & Armstrong, 2013, pp. 148 – 164).
Nevertheless, while the EU’s central decision-making bodies exclude third 
countries’ participation, the EU’s transgovernmental layer is more open for (sector-
specific) forms of organizational inclusion. In contrast to an EU based solely on the 
‘Community Method’ of European integration, which would promote regulatory 
extension without opportunities for organizational inclusion, transgovernmental 
politics theoretically allow for the simultaneous extension of the EU’s regulatory and 
organizational boundaries, thereby yielding hitherto understudied forms of external 
flexible integration (Lavenex, 2015, p. 839).
Considering the research problem, by controlling success to the national territory 
and administering justice within the AFSJ core functions of the state are involved. 
However institutional framework for policy-making in this field has focused on 
facilitating cooperation and coordination between member states on different rules 
than on other policy areas. Thus, the establishment of the three major agencies in this 
policy area, Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, focus on cooperation and coordination 
functions but without executive operational powers same as realisation of smart border 
strategy is essential. So Schengen cooperation with implementation of four great 
freedoms of movement, is certainly one of the most important part of EU integration 
process while being considered as crucial for the security issues, but also for success 
of the single market or economic union of the countries members of the EU. 
Accordingly, answering the research question, Schengen appears to be an example 
of main objectives of enhanced cooperation. Involved member states within this area 
represent different speeds and engagement then other EU countries in border, police 
cooperation and control flows of migration. Their integration’s engagement towards 
settled goals is more advanced that outside such cooperation. Furthermore, enhanced 
cooperation’s Schengen rules states that acts adopted under the framework of this 
21  For more: (Kasparek, 2016, pp. 59 – 78)
Michał Piechowicz134
cooperation scheme are binding only for the participants, which is basic general 
assumption in such cases.
Considering the main hypothesis, to continue to preserve the continent’s security 
and stability, pressure will increase on cooperation in policing, border security, im-
migration and judicial matters. In decision-making sphere, the first one was the 
need to split the Schengen acquis by applying the Community method to policies 
linked with borders, immigration, asylum and judicial cooperation in civil matters 
and by preserving the “intergovernmental” method for policies in the field on public 
security and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Before the Lisbon Treaty that 
was main example of differentiated integration within the AFSJ. Nowadays, as it is 
proved in this paper, Schengen regime is a complex model of integration, where the 
more advanced this polity is, the more differentiated integration within the Area of 
Freedom and Justice it represents.
Summing up, Schengen might be defined as an attempt to establish it as a ‘myth’. 
However such assumption might be well founded, although is too narrow to capture 
the complex nature and implications of the process leading to the creation of Europe’s 
new territorial regime. The existing conceptualisation of Schengen’s myth-making, 
borrowed from the state-building experience, entails a formalist, static, and essentialist 
notion of this process. It is based on the assumption (shared by most EU officials) 
that myths are narratives supported by a pre-arranged set of symbols (Zaiotti, 2011b, 
pp. 537 – 556) that can be deployed at will to persuade a rather passive audience.
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